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Abstract
Cryptocurrency off-chain networks such as Lightning (e.g., Bitcoin) or
Raiden (e.g., Ethereum) aim to increase the scalability of traditional on-
chain transactions. To support nodes in learning about possible paths to
route their transactions, these networks need to provide gossip and prob-
ing mechanisms. This paper explores whether these mechanisms may be
exploited to infer sensitive information about the flow of transactions, and
eventually harm privacy. In particular, we identify two threats, related to
an active and a passive adversary. The first is a probing attack: here the
adversary aims to detect the maximum amount which is transferable in a
given direction over a target channel by actively probing it and differen-
tiating the response messages it receives. The second is a timing attack:
the adversary discovers how close the destination of a routed payment
actually is, by acting as a passive man-in-the middle and analyzing the
time deltas between sent messages and their corresponding responses. We
then analyze the limitations of these attacks and propose remediations for
scenarios in which they are able to produce accurate results.
1 Introduction
Blockchains, the technology underlying cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin or Eth-
ereum, herald an era in which mistrusting entities can cooperate in the absence
of a trusted third party. However, current blockchain technology faces a scalab-
ility challenge, supporting merely tens of transactions per second, compared to
custodian payment systems which easily support thousands of transactions per
second. This is the result of the underlying global consensus algorithms, which
tread on the side of correctness rather than performance.
Off-chain networks [9], a.k.a. payment channel networks (PCNs) or second-
layer blockchain networks, have emerged as a promising solution to mitigate the
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blockchain scalability problem: by allowing participants to make payments dir-
ectly through a network of peer-to-peer payment channels, the overhead of global
consensus protocols and committing transactions on-chain can be avoided. Off-
chain networks such as Bitcoin Lightning [18], Ethereum Raiden [23], and XRP
Ripple [8], to just name a few, promise to primarily reduce load on the under-
lying blockchain, as well as drastically increasing transaction throughput, and
thus, being able to settle transactions in the matter of (sub-) seconds rather
than in minutes or in hours - along with substantially reducing transaction fees,
since now only one counterparty is responsible for validating a payment initially,
rather than the whole network.
In all of these networks, each node typically represents a user and each
weighted edge represents funds escrowed on a blockchain; these funds can be
transacted only between the endpoints of the edge. Many payment channel net-
works use source routing, in which the source of a payment specifies the complete
route for the payment. If the global view of all nodes is accurate, source routing
is highly effective because it finds all paths between pairs of nodes. Naturally,
nodes are likely to prefer paths with lower per-hop fees, and are only interested
in paths which support their transaction, i.e. which have a sufficient channel
capacity.
However, the fact that nodes need to be able to find routes also requires
mechanisms for nodes to learn about the payment channel network’s state. The
two typical mechanisms which enable nodes to find and create such paths are
gossip and probing. The gossip protocol defines messages which are to be broad-
cast in order for participants to be able to discover new nodes and channels and
keep track of currently known nodes and channels [15]. Probing is the mech-
anism which is used to construct an actual payment route based on a local
network view delivered by gossip, and ultimately perform the payment. In the
context of §4, we are going to exploit probing to discover whether a payment
has occurred over a target channel. The gossip store is queried for viable routes
to the destination, based on the desired route properties [25]. Because the gos-
sip store contains global channel information, it is possible to query payment
routes originating from any node on the network. Due to privacy concerns, gos-
sip messages only include the total balance for any given channel rather than
the balance each node is holding.
This paper explores the question whether the inherent need for nodes to
discover routes in general, and the gossip and probing mechanisms in particular,
can be exploited to infer sensitive information about the off-chain network and
its transactions.
1.1 Our Contributions
This paper identifies two novel threats for the confidentiality of off-chain net-
works. In particular, we consider the Lightning Network as a case study and
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present two attacks, an active one and a passive one. The active one is a probing
attack in which the adversary wants to determine the maximum amount which
can be transferred over a target channel it is directly or indirectly connected to,
by active probing. The passive one is a timing attack in which the adversary
discovers how close the destination of a routed payment actually is, by act-
ing as a man-in-the middle and listening for / analyzing certain well-defined
messages. We then analyze these attacks, identify limitations and also propose
remediations for scenarios in which they are able to produce accurate results.
1.2 Organization
Our paper is organized as follows. We introduce some preliminaries in §2, and
then first describe the probing attack in §4 followed by the timing attack in §5.
We review related work in §3 and conclude in §6.
2 Preliminaries
While our contribution is applicable to the concept of off-chain networks in
general, to be concrete, we will consider the Bitcoin Lightning Network (LN)
as a case study in this paper. In the following, we will provide some specific
preliminaries which are necessary to understand the remainder of this paper.
The messages which are passed from one Lightning node to another are spe-
cified in the Basics of Lightning Technology (BOLTs) [17]. Each message is
divided into a subcategory, called a layer. This provides superior separation of
concerns, as each layer has a specific task and, similarly to the layers found in
the Internet Protocol Suite, is agnostic to the other layers.
For example in Lightning, the channel announce and channel update mes-
sages are especially crucial for correct payment routing by other nodes on the
network. channel announce signals the creation of a new channel between two
LN nodes and is broadcast exactly once.
channel update is propagated at least once by each endpoint, since even
initially each of them may have a different fee schedule and thus, routing capa-
city may differ depending on the direction the payment is taking (i.e., when c
is the newly created channel between A and B, whether c is used in direction
AB or BA). Once a viable route has been determined, the sending node needs
to construct a message (a transaction “request”) which needs to be sent to the
first hop along the route. Each payment request is accompanied by an onion
routing packet containing route information. Upon receiving a payment request
each node strips one layer of encryption, extracting its routing information, and
ultimately preparing the onion routing packet for the next node in the route.
For the sake of simplicity, cryptographic aspects are going to be omitted for the
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rest of this chapter. We refer to [14] and [16] for specifics.
Two BOLT Layer 2 messages are essential in order to to establish a payment
chain:
• update add htlc: This message signals to the receiver, that the sender
would like to establish a new HTLC (Hash Time Locked Contract), con-
taining a certain amount of millisatoshis, over a given channel. The mes-
sage also contains an onion routing packet field, which contains inform-
ation to be forwarded to the next hop along the route. In Figure 1, the
sender initially sets up an HTLC with Hop 1. The onion routing field
contains another update add htlc (set up between Hop 1 and Hop 2),
which in turn contains the ultimate update add htlc (set up between
Hop 2 and Destination) in the onion routing field.
• update fulfill htlc: Once the payment message has reached the des-
tination node, it needs to release the payment hash preimage in order to
claim the funds which have been locked in the HTLCs along the route
by the forwarded update add htlc messages. For further information on
why this is necessary and how HTLCs ensure trustless payment chains,
see [4]. To achieve this, the preimage is passed along the route backwards,
thereby resolving the HTLCs and committing the transfer of funds (see
Steps 4, 5, 6 in Figure 1).
Source DestinationHop 2Hop 1
update_add_htlc
1
4
update_add_htlc
3
update_add_htlc
2
update_fulfill_htlc
6 5
update_fulfill_htlcupdate_fulfill_htlc
Figure 1: An exemplary transaction from source to destination, involving two
intermediate nodes.
The gossip messages mentioned earlier are sent to every adjacent node and
eventually propagate through the entire network.
update add htlc and update fulfill htlc however, are only sent/forwar-
ded to the node on the other end of the HTLC.
In order to test the attacks proposed in §4 and §5, we have set up a testing
network consisting of four c-lightning [2] nodes, with two local network com-
puters running two local nodes each (Figure 2). Nodes 1 and 2 are connected
via a local network link and can form hops for payment routes between Nodes
4
3 and 4. In order to interact with the nodes, we have made use of c-lightning’s
RPC interface and built our software tool set in Python [19]. The tests and
their corresponding results in 5 have also been verified with LND [3], another
BOLT-conform Lightning Network implementation, written in Go.
Node 2
Node 1 Node 3
Node 4
System A
System B
Figure 2: Local Testing Setup
3 Related Work
Off-chain networks in general and the Lightning network in particular have re-
cently received much attention, and we refer the reader to the excellent survey
by Gudgeon et al. [9]. The Lightning Network as an second-layer network al-
ternative to pure on-chain transactions was first proposed by [22], with the
technical specifications laid out in [18]. Despite being theoretically currency-
agnostic, current implementations such as c-lightning [2] and LND [3] support
BTC exclusively. A popular alternative for ERC-20 based tokens is the Raiden
Network [23].
Several papers have already analyzed security and privacy concerns in off-
chain networks. Rohrer et al. [24] focus on channel-based attacks and proposes
methods to exhaust a victim’s channels via malicious routing (up to potentially
total isolation from the victim’s neighbors) and to deny service to a victim via
malicious HTLC construction. Tochner et al. [27] propose a denial of service at-
tack by creating low-fee channels to other nodes, which are then naturally used
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to route payments for fee-minimizing network participants and then dropping
the payment packets, therefore forcing the sender to await the expiration of the
already set-up HTLCs.
[10] provides a closer look into the privacy-performance trade-off inherent
in LN routing. The authors also propose an attack to discover channel bal-
ances within the network. Wang et al. [28] examine the LN routing process
in more detail and proposes a split routing approach, dividing payments into
large size and small size transactions. The authors show that by routing large
payments dynamically to avoid superfluous fees and by routing small payments
via a lookup mechanism to reduce excessive probing, the overall success rate
can be maintained while significantly reducing performance overhead. Beres et
al. [6] make a a case for most LN transactions not being truly private, since
their analysis has found that most payments occur via single-hop paths. As a
remediation, the authors propose partial route obfuscation/extension by adding
multiple low-fee hops. Currently still work in progress, [5] is very close to [4]
in its approach and already provides some insights into second-layer payments,
invoices and payment channels in general. The Lightning Network uses the
Sphinx protocol to implement onion routing, as specified in [14]. The version
used in current Lightning versions is based on [7] and [11], the latter of which
also provides performance comparisons between competing protocols.
4 Probing Attack
4.1 Design
The Lightning Network uses an invoice system to handle payments. A LN in-
voice consists of a destination node ID, a label, a creation timestamp, an expiry
timestamp, a CLTV (Check Lock Time Verify) expiry timestamp and a payment
hash. Paying an invoice with a randomized payment hash is possible (since the
routing nodes are yet oblivious to the actual hash) and will route the payment
successfully to its’ destination, which forms the basis of this attack. Optionally
it can contain an amount (leaving this field empty would be equal in principle
to a blank cheque), a verbal description, a BTC fallback address in case the
payment is unsuccessful, and a payment route suggestion. This invoice is then
encoded, signed by the payee, and finally sent to the payer.
Having received a valid invoice (e.g. through their browser or directly via
e-mail), the payer can now either use the route suggestion within the invoice
or query the network themselves, and then send the payment to the payee
along the route which has been determined. In this section, we will use the
c-lightning RPC interface via Python exclusively - the functions involved are
getroute() [25] and sendpay() [26], which takes two arguments: the return
object from a getroute() call for a given route, a given amount and a given
riskfactor, as well as the payment hash. Using sendpay() on its own (meaning,
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with a random payment hash instead of data from a corresponding invoice) will
naturally result in one of two following error codes:
• 204 (failure along route): This error indicates that one of the hops was
unable to forward the payment to the next hop. This can be either due to
insufficient funds or a non-existent connection between two adjacent hops
along the specified route. If we have ensured that all nodes are connected
as depicted in Figure 2, we can safely assume the former. One sequence
of events leading up to this error can be seen in Figure 3.
Node 2
Node 1 Node 3
Node 4
1) sendpay(tx, payment_hash)
2) sendpay
(tx, payment_hash)
4,5) HTLC
rollbacks
3) insufficient capacity
to Node 4
6) error code 204
Figure 3: Causing a 204 error by trying to send a payment to Node 4, which
Node 3 is unable to perform.
• 16399 (permanent failure at destination): Given the absence of a
204 error, the attempted payment has reached the last hop. As we are
using a random payment hash, realistically the destination node will throw
an error, signalling that no matching preimage has been found to produce
the payment hash. The procedure to provoke a 16399 error code can be
seen in Figure 4.
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Node 2
Node 1 Node 3
Node 4
1) sendpay(tx, payment_hash)
2) sendpay
(tx, payment_hash) 5,6,7) HTLC
rollbacks
4) no matching
preimage
8) error code 16399
3) sendpay 
(tx, payment_hash)
Figure 4: Causing a 16399 error by trying to send a payment to Node 4, who
can’t produce a matching preimage and thus fails the payment.
The goal of this attack is to trace payment flow over a channel, which the
attacker node is directly or indirectly connected to. The attacker node will
therefore initially attempt to determine whether a payment has occurred over
the observed channel between the penultimate and final node along the route.
To this end, the attacker will send out periodic probes to the final node (the
”victim”), containing the amount which has been determined by the initial
probe. If channel weights remain unaltered, each of these probes should return
a 16399 error code. If a payment does occur however, the penultimate node will
find itself unable to forward the payment on the outgoing channel to our target,
yielding a 204 error response. Upon receiving this message, we can then restart
the process of our initial probe and ultimately arrive at the exact amount of
millisatoshis (msat), which have been transferred.
4.2 Lab Implementation
Recalling Figure 2, we have chosen Node 3 as our attacker node and Node 4
as our target node - hence, the initial goal of Node 3 is to determine the max-
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imum payment flow between Nodes 2 and 4. To conduct our tests, each of the
channels has been set up with a balance of 200,000,000 msat, with each node
holding a stake of 100,000,000 msat in each of its channels. Node 3 will hold a
slightly higher balance in order to accommodate probing fees. We can use the
total channel balance, as received via gossip, as an upper ceiling for this value
(200,000,000 msat in this case). We can then send payments from Node 3 to
Node 4 with random payment hashes - resulting in either error code 16399 or
error code 204 (§4.1). To this end, we perform a binary search on the available
funds which we can transfer, searching for the highest value yielding a 16399
error instead of a 204 error. The algorithms used for both initial probing and
deriving the actual channel balance from Node 2 to Node 4 are depicted in Al-
gorithms 1 and 2.
Algorithm 1: Probing a channel for a given amount of msat
Result: Either error code 204 or 16399
payment hash = random.hex();
node id = node ID of final node on victim channel;
msat = value to probe for ;
route = getroute(node id, msat);
sendpay(route, payment hash);
Algorithm 2: Finding the initial maximum channel balance
Result: amount msat - initial channel balance
min msat = 0;
max msat = channel.balance;
amount msat = channel.balance / 2;
while True do
if probe(amount msat) == 16399 then
min msat = amount msat;
else
if amount msat) == 204 then
max msat = amount msat;
else
return ”No suitable route found.”;
end
end
if max msat - min msat ¡ 1000 then
return amount msat;
else
// continue to minimise maximum error
end
amount msat = (min msat + max msat) / 2
end
We thus arrive at the approximate maximum amount, which Node 2 can
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transfer to Node 4. The next step is to continuously probe for this amount of
msat in regular intervals. The expected response is a 16399 error code, with a
204 error code implying that the amount we are trying to send is higher than
the available amount which Node 2 can transfer to Node 4 (or that it has discon-
nected from Node 4). Upon receiving a 204 response, we start looking for the
maximum payable amount to Node 4 once more. Subtracting the new amount
from the old amount, we arrive at the size of the transaction which has occurred
between Nodes 3 and 4.
After 17 probes by Node 3, Algorithm 2 has yielded an initial balance of
99,999,237 msat, which is in line with the channel balance we have allocated
between Nodes 2 and 4. The next step is to monitor the channel for potential
weight changes (Algorithm 3).
Algorithm 3: Finding the initial maximum channel balance
Result: New maximum flow from penultimate to final node
init max = initial channel balance;
new max = init max;
t = time to wait between checks;
while True do
sleep(t);
if probe(init max) == 204 then
// channel balance has decreased
return find init max();
// potentially calculate delta
else
if (init max + 1000) == 16399 then
// channel balance has increased
return find init max();
// potentially calculate delta
else
return error;
end
end
end
To verify this, we have transferred 50,000,000 msat from Node 2 to Node 4,
with our program detecting this soon after (we have set t to 5 seconds in order to
avoid excessive probing) and returning an updated balance of 49,998,237 msat.
We then transferred another 30,000,000 msat from Node 1 to Node 4, with our
program again picking up the change and reporting the new channel balance at
19,997,389 msat.
Figure 5 shows the trade-off between probing run time and the error in the
channel balance estimate we observed for test runs on our lab setup. As we
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wanted to avoid overly excessive probing while conducting our tests, we were
generally satisfied with any answer which is less than 1000 msat (the actual
minimum BTC denomination) lower than the actual channel balance. Another
possible approach could be keeping the number of probes sent out to the target
constant, hence providing a more uniform level of balance error and probing
duration.
1.00s
2.00s
4.00s
8.00s
16.00s
32.00s
64.00s
0.0001%
0.0010%
0.0100%
0.1000%
1.0000%
10.0000%
100.0000%
Error Duration
Figure 5: Visualizing the trade-off between probing accuracy and duration.
4.3 BTC Testnet Evaluation
For analysis on the feasibility of our attack over the BTC Testnet, we connected
Nodes 1, 2 and 3 from Figure 2 to the ”ion.radar.tech” Testnet Lightning node.
We chose this host in particular, since their website allowed us to alter the chan-
nel weights by generating payable invoices with parameters of our choosing. The
exact connections along with the corresponding channel weights can be seen in
Figure 6. Our goal was to verify the results we obtained in 4.2 and see whether
probing duration (see Figure 5) was affected by the public Testnet hop in place
of the local hop(s) used in 4.2. Running an initial series of probes from Node
3 to Node 1, we arrived at a channel balance of 149,926,757 msat between the
radar.ion.tech node and Node 1 (99.95% accuracy). We attribute this compar-
atively high error in regard to our tests in 4.2 due to the Testnet nodes’ differing
fee structure, which is necessarily taken into account when constructing the pay-
ment route. Then, we sent a payment containing 50,000,000 msat from Node 2
to Node 1 - predictably, Node 3 returned the updated maximum payment flow
on the observed channel correctly with 99,902,343 msat (99.9 % accuracy).
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Node 3
radar.ion.tech
Node 1
50,000
150,000 50,000
2,950,000
Figure 6: Setup and balance allocations of our first testnet evaluation (balances
given in satoshis).
After verifying the correct operation of our program for 16399 error codes, we
were keen on discovering whether 204 error code scenarios would be dealt with
correctly as well. In order to test this, we transferred back any amounts which
have been redistributed as part of our initial test, increased the channel balance
between Node 1 and radar.ion.tech by a factor of 10 and modified the setup
from Figure 6 slightly by placing an intermediary hop between radar.ion.tech
and Nodes 2 and 3. The updated infrastructure can be seen in Figure 7.
lnd.vanilla.co.za
Node 3
Node 2
radar.ion.techNode 1
50,000 150,000 ??? ??? 50,000,000 150,000,000
200,000,000
0
Figure 7: Initial setup and balance allocations of our second Testnet evaluation
(balances given in satoshis).
It became apparent however, that we would need to rethink the weights
we allotted to the respective nodes, as we were initially unaware of the true
channel weights between the radar.ion.tech and ”lnd.vanilla.co.za” nodes. Nat-
urally, we were inclined to simply run the find init max() function (Algorithm
2) from Node 3 on the ion.radar.tech node. However, we found that the two
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nodes were connected by 6 channels rather than one. To circumvent this route
ambiguity, we queried a route for 1,000, 1,000,000 an 1,000,000,000 msat using
default parameters, hoping all of them would return the same route, thus allow-
ing us to treat the resulting channel as the only one connecting these two nodes.
Unfortunately though, we received varying responses for all of these amounts,
introducing a large uncertainty in any subsequent measurements. We then tried
to run our tests on these channels, with all of them reporting failure in estab-
lishing a route to the target. We are not sure why even the initial probes failed
and only further analysis and testing of our program will unveil the error in our
approach. We decided to conclude our Testnet evaluation at this point, since
despite extensive refactoring, we were not able to produce meaningful results for
this constellation of nodes and channels, leaving route ambiguity and handling
of multiple channels to be explored by further research in this area.
4.4 Results, Implications, and further Considerations
In §4.2 we have demonstrated that it is in fact possible to trace channel payments
if the network is structured in a certain way. In theory, this method should hold
true for any node which is reachable from the attacking node and has only one
channel whose balance is lower or or equal to the second lowest balance on the
route from the attacking node. We have partially verified this supposition in
4.3 while maintaining a high accuracy in our successful measurements. This
is particularly a threat to end users, since most of them connect to a single
well-connected node over a single channel, in order to interact with the rest of
the network [1]. Nonetheless, there are several caveats to this method, the most
significant of which are:
• Excluding the possibility of payment forwarding: The attack laid
out in this chapter does not take into account the fact that nodes can
be used to forward payments. Hearkening back to Figure 2, if we were
to select the channel between Nodes 1 and 2 as our target, transactions
between Nodes 1 and 4 would appear as if they were transactions to Node
3. One opportunity of accounting for this would be to monitor every
channel to and from Node 3 for changes in directed channel balance, which
would create problems on its own (see below).
• Surge of unresolved HTLCs while probing: Recalling steps 5-7
in Figure 4, each probe sets up a chain of irredeemable HTLCs (since
a matching preimage would have to be brute-forced). Eventually, run-
ning multiple probes over the same channels will escrow its funds in these
HTLCs, effectively DOSing the probe route and forcing the nodes to wait
until the HTLCs time out before being able to forward other payments.
This is an issue we encountered over and over during 4.2 and 4.3, often
giving us one shot at probing before having to wait multiple hours for the
HTLCs to expire. This is also why we chose the channels leading up to our
final target to have a much higher balance, so that we would have enough
13
balance left after initial probing to monitor the channel for a reasonable
period of time.
• Insufficient sensitivity for high-frequency transactions: Looking
back at Algorithm 3, we have defined the parameter t as the time, for
which to wait during probes for monitoring the channel balance, one the
initial maximum value has been discovered. If more than one transac-
tion would occur during this timeframe, it would still only show up as a
singular payment with our tool. In the worst-case scenario, two transac-
tions covering the same amount could take place in opposite directions,
not changing the weighted balance at all and thus eluding our detection
mechanisms.
• Omission of private channels: Upon creating a channel, the node can
declare the channel as private, and thus prevent it from being broadcast
via gossip. The channel is fully functional for both nodes which are con-
nected by it, but no foreign payments can be routed through it. Looking
ahead to increasing adoption of the Lightning Network, this provides an in-
triguing opportunity for nodes, which do not wish to participate in routing
(e.g. mobile wallets) or nodes with limited uptime (personal computers).
Routing would only occur between aggregating nodes (such as payment
providers), with most of the channels (and therefore nodes) on the network
remaining invisible to malicious participants as the gossip protocol would
only propagate public channels. This further exacerbates our ability to
detect forwarded payments (see above) as opposed to actual payments,
since private channels can’t be monitored by design.
• Disregard of potential bottlenecks: The proposed method of mon-
itoring channel transactions does not hold, if a single channel along the
route has a lower balance than the target channel in the desired direc-
tion. The node which has an insufficient amount of msat on its’ outgoing
channel would return a 204 error (Figure 3) This can often happen if an
end user node is used as a hop prior to a high-capacity node. It is easy
to detect which channel acts as a bottleneck, however a bit trickier to
circumvent this obstacle - we would like to point the interested reader to
[27] for suggestions on route hijacking and thus effectively bypassing the
bottleneck along the route.
During the tests we conducted in 4.3, we also encountered the hops between
Node 1 and Node 3 being connected via multiple channels. As confirmed by
our observations, it is entirely possible to receive varying routes for differing
amount msat, riskfactor, cltv and fuzzpercent [25] combinations. Our tool failed
to produce accurate results in this scenario, as it was designed assuming sin-
gular channels between pairs of nodes. It is however perfectly reasonable to
have multiple channels between two nodes, as channel balances are final and
can’t be increased after creation. We expect this to be the predominant form
of retrospectively increasing potential payment flow between nodes and further
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research on how to deal with this complication would be highly appreciated.
All in all, the probing attack we laid out in this chapter can be seen more as a
proof of concept rather than a realistic attack vector, due to the limitations dis-
cussed in 4.4. We are confident that certain aspects such as the exact algorithm
and route construction could be refined to provide more reliable results. How-
ever other aspects such as the binding of channel funds in irredeemable HTLCs
and the incomplete network view due to private channels provide a much more
consistent barrier to uncovering payment flows in real-world scenarios.
5 Timing Attack
5.1 Design
The Lightning Network is often referred to as a payment channel network
(PCN). Performing payments over multiple hops is possible due to the use of
HTLC’s [22], a special bitcoin transaction whose unlocking conditions effect-
ively rid the Lightning Network and its users of all trust requirements. An
exemplary chain of HTLCs along with their shortened unlocking conditions is
shown in Figure 8. Note that any node can only retrieve the funds locked in the
HTLCs if they share R, and that each HTLC starting from Node 4 is valid for 2
hours longer than the previous HTLC to provide some room for error/downtime.
Due to the Onion Routing properties of the Lightning Network, it is crypto-
graphically infeasible to try and determine where along the route a forwarding
node is located, since each node can only decrypt the layer which was inten-
ded for it to decrypt. Attempts to analyze the remaining length of the routing
packet have been thwarted at the protocol level by implementing a fixed packet
size with zero padding at the final layer [14].
The only opportunity left to analyze the encrypted traffic between the nodes
is to extract time-related information from the messages. One possibility would
be to analyze the cltv expiry delta field (analogous to “hours passed” in
Figure 8, measured in mined blocks since the establishment of the HTLC): By
looking at the delay of both the incoming and the outgoing HTLC, a node could
infer how many hops are left until the payment destination. However, this pos-
sibility has been accounted for by the adding ”shadow routes” to the actual
payment path, with each node fuzzing path information by adding a random
offset to the cltv expiry delta value, hence effectively preventing nodes from
guessing their position along the payment route [15].
The method we propose, is to time messages at the network level, rather
than at the protocol level (e.g. through cltv expiry delta). Recalling Figure
8, Node 2 can listen for response messages from Node 4, since there is currently
no mechanism in place to add delay to update fulfill htlc responses (in fact,
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Node 2
Node 1 Node 3
Node 4
1) send invoice,
along with payment hash H(R)
2) HTLC: signature of Node 1 and R or 
signature of Node 3 and 6 hours passed
3) HTLC: sig(Node 2 && R) or
sig(Node 1) && 4 hours passed
4) HTLC: sig(Node 4 && R) or
sig(Node 2) && 2 hours passed
7) R (preimage)
9) R
8) R
Figure 8: Paying a LN invoice over multiple hops. Messages 2-4 are
update add htlc messages, messages 7-9 are update fulfill htlc messages.
[13] states that “a node SHOULD remove an HTLC as soon as it can”). Based
on response latency, Node 2 could infer its position along the payment route to
a certain extent, as examined in §5.2.
5.2 Lab Implementation
Initial analysis has shown that analyzing packets directly (e.g. via Wireshark) is
of little avail, since LN messages are end-to-end encrypted - meaning that even
if we know the target nodes’ IP address and port number, we can not detect
the exact nature of the messages exchanged. We hence chose to redirect the
output of the listening c-lightning node to a log file, which we then analyze with
a Python script. As in §4, the source code can be found at [19].
Looking at the log file, we are particularly interested in the two messages
discussed in §2: update add htlc and update fulfill htlc. The node output
includes these events, complete with timestamps and the corresponding node
ID with which the HTLC is negotiated. By repeatedly sending money back and
forth between Nodes 1 and 3 in our test setup (Figure 2), we arrive at a local
(and therefore minimum) latency of 182ms on average. The latency distribution
16
for small (1,000 msat) payments can be seen in Figure 9. We have found that
latencies remain largely unaffected by transaction size - increasing payment size
by a factor of 100,000 actually slightly reduced average settlement time and
standard deviation (Figure 10).
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Figure 9: Latency times for local payments containing 1,000 msat (µ = 0.1852,
σ = 0.0974, n = 25)
Next, we examined whether an increase in hop distance would yield predict-
able results. To this end, we first timed payments over 1 network hop from
Node 2 to Node 1 (Figure 11). Then, we timed payments over the same amount
over 1 network and 1 local hop from Node 2 to Node 3 (Figure 12). Based on
these results, we derive that timing messages on a local network with little to
no interfering traffic scales predictably over several hops, with 1 network hop
roughly corresponding to 1.284 local hops in terms of latency.
5.3 BTC Testnet Evaluation
Building on the results obtained in 5.2, we were keen to discover whether the
they would carry over into real-world evaluations. To this end, we connected
Node 1 and Node 3 from Figure 2 to the ”endurance” Lightning Testnet node.
Located in Dublin, Ireland and being connected to over 500 other Lightning
Testnet nodes [1], we concluded that this node would provide a good entry
point to test network latency from our location in Vienna, Austria, with the
possibility to construct longer and more complicated routes over it as we saw
fit. In order to constitute an initial RTT value, we established an HTTP con-
nection to Lightning’s default port 9735 [12], since the target host appeared
to drop our ICMP ping requests. Alternating our requests between Systems A
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Figure 10: Latency times for local payments containing 100,000,000 msat (µ =
0.1798, σ = 0.0385, n = 25)
0.00s
0.10s
0.20s
0.30s
0.40s
0.50s
0.60s
0.70s
0.80s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Figure 11: Latency times for payments containing 100,000,000 msat over 1
network hop (µ = 0.234, σ = 0.025, n = 25)
and B (Figure 2) in an attempt to prevent cached responses, we have found
that HTTP response times were fairly constant from this node, with an average
response time of 0.067s (σ = 0.0206).
Next, we were interested whether payments over the public hop were sub-
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Figure 12: Latency times for payments containing 100,000,000 msat over 1
network hop and 1 local hop (µ = 0.414, σ = 0.05, n = 25)
ject to an equally uniform latency as in 5.2. Thus, we created 25 invoices over
1,000,000 msat each (having found in 5.2 that response latency is independent
of payment size) at Node 3 and sent the payment from Node 1. As seen in Fig-
ure 13, the fulfill message response times were remarkably consistent, however
latency did not scale to our expectations. Based on Figure 12, we expected to
be overall latency to be in the ballpark of 0.5-0.7 seconds (2x local network RTT
+ HTTP request RTT), however actual latency was twice that value. Results
from the aranguren.org Testnet node, located in Melbourne, Australia, proved
equally consistent with an average ping time of 0.314s (σ = 0.035) and an av-
erage HTLC fulfillment latency of 1.68s (σ = 0.0972)
Finally, we were curious about HTLC fulfillment delays over 2 public hops.
To this end, we closed the channel between Node 3 and endurance and opened a
new channel to the ”aranguren.org” Testnet node, which in turn has a channel
with endurance and thus re-establishes the chain of channels from Node 1 to
Node 3. Timing results for this route can be seen in Figure 14. This marked the
end of our timing tests, since we were not able to establish an acyclic payment
route over 3 or more publicly available LN nodes. This coincides with the
observation that neither the attempted nor the actual payments we performed
during the course of 4 and 5 were routed over more than two public hops.
5.4 Results, Implications and further Considerations
Considering the findings in §5.2, we can see that timing produces fairly reliable
and uniformly distributed results over a local network with little outside inter-
19
0.70s
0.80s
0.90s
1.00s
1.10s
1.20s
1.30s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Figure 13: Latency times for payments between Node 1 and Node 3 over the
endurance Lightning node (µ = 1.0179, σ = 0.0542, n = 25)
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Figure 14: Latency times for payments between Node 1 and Node 3 over the
endurance and aranguren.org Lightning nodes (µ = 2.3349, σ = 0.0475, n = 25)
ference. Yet, due to the nature of LN routing, it is not possible to determine
the distance or path to the initial payment source. To our surprise however,
RTT remained equally consistent over 1-2 internet hops. Data acquired during
monitoring of the local (mostly idle) network suggests that the timing node
won’t be able to distinguish traffic originating from a local node from the traffic
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in §5.2 without further information due to low latency deltas ranging from 2ms
to 5ms.
While performing timing measurements for payments across the BTC Test-
net network, we have found that HTLC settlement takes long enough over even
1 hop to make traffic RTT volatility negligible. Over 1 hop, we conclude that
HTLC settlement for our Vienna-based node should be in the ballpark of 0.86
- 1.97 seconds with 2-hop latency amounting to roughly 1.99 - 2.68 seconds,
depending on the geographical location and assuming a normal distribution for
the measured latency deltas. Further research could include a further statist-
ical examination of the ability to differentiate distances for HTLC deltas at the
sub-2-second threshold. We suggest that overall network bandwidth does not
affect the acquired results significantly, since after performing all payments in
4, Node 1 has sent 64 KB and Node 3 has received 55 KB - only a fraction of
which were outgoing/incoming HTLCs (alongside gossip, pings, etc.).
Our results open many new avenues for further timing-based research on the
Lightning Network. The next step for us would be to develop a tool to predict
the distance to the final destination of an HTLC which is passing through the
listening node, based on the measurements laid out in 5.3. It would be inter-
esting to see whether there is a possibility to force payment-unrelated response
messages, e.g. by forging ping messages [12] in order to estimate (possibly
network-wide) RTTs, correlate HTLC settlement latencies against them and fi-
nally arrive at a set of nodes which must have been the ultimate recipient of the
forwarded payment. Furthermore, experiments could be conducted on the feas-
ibility of adding a random time offset to HTLC fulfillments, and the trade-offs
involved therein.
6 Conclusion
This paper has shown that off-chain routing and payment settlement mechan-
isms may be exploited to infer confidential information about the network state.
In particular, considering the Lightning Network with Bitcoin as the underly-
ing blockchain as a case study, we set up a local infrastructure and proposed
two ways in which two current state-of-the-art implementations, c-lightning and
LND, can be exploited to gain knowledge about distant channel balances and
transactions to unconnected nodes: By deliberately failing payment attempts,
we were able to deduce the exact amount of (milli-)satoshis on a channel located
two hops away on our local lab infrastructure. Using this technique repeatedly,
we were able to determine whether a transaction occurred between one node
and another over the monitored channel. To a certain extent, we were able
to reproduce these results in the public Bitcoin Testnet chain. We also identi-
fied this attacks’ limitations and proposed some workarounds to these obstacles.
By timing the messages related to HTLC construction and termination, we
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were able to infer the remaining distance of a forwarded packet accurately in
our test lab. These results transferred well into our Testnet evaluation, while
being free of the partially restrictive limitations which we discovered during our
examination of the probing attack. We concluded that RTT volatility of the
HTLC message cycle was low enough for public Testnet hops which were within
geographical vicinity to our node in Vienna, Austria, as well as for hops which
were located in East Asia, to establish latency approximate latency boundar-
ies for the number of remaining hops along the payment route of a forwarded
transaction.
Our work raises several interesting research questions. In particular, it re-
mains to fine-tune our attacks, to improve the flexibility of our software tools
and to finally conduct more systematic experiments including more natural/in-
terconnected network topologies, particularly on other off-chain networks. More
generally, it will be interesting to explore further attacks on the confidentiality
of off-chain networks exploiting the routing mechanism and investigate counter-
measures. Furthermore, our work raises the question whether such vulnerabil-
ities are an inherent price of efficient off-chain routing or if there exist rigorous
solutions.
Bibliographical Note. A preliminary version of this article appears at ICISSP
2020 [21]. The work herein is based on the thesis of Utz Nisslmueller [20].
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